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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880274-CA
Priority No. 2

STEVEN J. PYEATT,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The Statement of the Issues, Statement of the Case, and
Summary of the Argument are set forth in Appellant's opening brief
at v., 1 and 6-7.

Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to

Points I and II of Respondent's Brief.

Point III is adequately

briefed in Appellant's opening brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The affidavit did not outline sufficient facts for a
finding of probable cause.

No one claimed to have seen cocaine

inside the Montgomery Avenue premises or to have obtained the
cocaine from those premises.

The cases cited by the State are

distinguishable from the present case on their facts; the facts set
forth in the affidavit required speculation and reliance on
circumstantial events, missing information and guesswork.
Droubay acted intentionally or with a reckless disregard
for the truth in preparing the affidavit.

Without the material

misrepresentations and with the inclusion of the material omissions,

probable cause did not exist.
In the event this Court determines that the fourth
amendment was not violated in this case, Utah case law and the facts
of this case require a different interpretation of the Utah
Constitution,

Pursuant to such interpretation, the entire affidavit

and search warrant should be quashed where an officer includes
misrepresentations of the facts or omits material facts
intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth; where such
misrepresentations or omissions are negligently made, a remedy
should also be available.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT ARE
INVALID UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
A. THE AFFIDAVIT WAS FACIALLY DEFICIENT IN THAT
IT FAILED TO STATE SUFFICIENT FACTS FOR A
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
While the State is correct in asserting that a
magistrate's determination of probable cause should be given
deference (Respondent's brief at 5-7), such a rule of law does not
mandate upholding a search warrant in all cases.

In situations

where the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
do not support a finding of probable cause, the search warrant must
be quashed despite the deference given the magistrate.
In the instant case, as set forth in Appellant's opening

brief at 8-17, the affidavit in support of the search warrant did
not establish probable cause to believe that cocaine and cocaine
paraphernalia would be found in the premises at 533 Montgomery.

The

State suggests that in making such an argument, Appellant has
engaged in a technical dissection of the affidavit or has asked this
Court "to cut the circumstances encompassed in the affidavit into
pieces for strict scrutiny to avoid the accepted Gates totality
standard."

Respondent's brief at 12. This is an incorrect

perception of Appellant's argument.
The Gates totality approach requires a reading of the
affidavit "in its entirety and in a common sense fashion . . . ."
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1102 (Utah 1983).

In reading an

affidavit in its "entirety," the various components of the affidavit
must be reviewed.
Where an informant supplied the information upon which
the affidavit is based, the reliability of the informant and the
basis of his knowledge remain two relevant considerations under
Gates in assessing whether the totality of the circumstances support
a finding of probable cause.
1987).

State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah

As the Hansen Court pointed out, although these are not

strict, independent requirements and a weakness in one or the other
may not be fatal to the warrant, they remain as two factors to be
considered.

Hence, under Hansen and Gates, the reliability of the

informant and the basis of his knowledge are considered against a
background of the remaining circumstances in determining whether
probable cause existed.
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Just as the informant's reliability and basis of
knowledge are two "nonexclusive elements to be evaluated" (Hansen/
732 P.2d at 130), the passage of time since the incidents outlined
in the affidavit occurred is another factor to be considered when
looking at the totality of the circumstances.

The State correctly

points out that "[a] mere passage of time does not necessarily
invalidate the supporting basis for the warrant" and that the focus
should be on whether "a common sense reading of that affidavit
suggested the continuing nature of the drug's presence."
Respondent's Brief at 13.

In the present case, anywhere from five

to sixteen days had passed since the second "buy" outlined in the
affidavit occurred.

The remoteness of the two buys when considered

in conjunction with the remaining circumstances does not support a
finding that an ongoing drug operation which was still in existence
was occurring at the Montgomery address.

Of particular support to

this statement are the fact that only two buys occurred where a
person drove to the Montgomery address and no one claimed to have
seen

cocaine inside the Montgomery address.

Under such

circumstances, the remoteness is critical - even if the cocaine had
come from the Montgomery address, nothing suggests it would still be
there .1
The facts in Hansen are significantly different from the
facts in the case currently before the Court.

In Hansen, "the

1 Of note is the small amount of cocaine seized at the
Montgomery address. The amount found is less than one would expect
for an ongoing drug operation.
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suspect was known by the police to have been involved in drug
violations."

732 P.2d at 131.

In the current case, the affidavit

contained no information that either "Randy" or Appellant were known
to have been involved in drug transactions.
Second, in Hansen, "[t]he informant viewed a large
quantity of marijuana being sold in smaller quantities in the
apartment" which was searched.

J[d.

In the present case, the

affidavit contained no assertion that either "Randy" or the
informant viewed cocaine in the Montgomery house.
Third, in Hansen, "[t]he affidavit further averred that
marijuana was still in the apartment."

_ld. No such assertion

occurred in the affidavit currently before the Court.
Furthermore, in reaching its decision, the Hansen Court
pointed out that the information supplied by the confidential
informant which was "relied upon by police, was not some remote
hearsay or assumption based on circumstancial events." ^Id. at 130.
The facts in this case are distinct since the information relied
upon by officers was "remote hearsay" of "Randy" coupled with
"circumstantial events."

Hence, a comparison of the facts in the

present case with those in Hansen does not support a finding of
probable cause.
In State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), just as
in Hansen, the confidential informant had actually observed the
controlled substances inside the premises which were searched.

Id.

at 1259. Under such circumstances, a finding of probable cause is
more compelling than a case such as the present one where no one
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indicated that he had in fact seen drugs inside the premises to be
searched and, in fact, the confidential informant did not even state
that he had received the drugs from the person who had gone to those
premises.
In its brief, the State emphasizes the statement made in
Appellant's opening brief at 9 that "the facts set forth in the
affidavit may have raised a suspicion" and suggests that such a
statement is a concession that probable cause existed in this case.
Respondent's brief at 7, 10.

The State's approach misinterprets the

meaning of the word "suspicion" and asks this Court to engage in an
exercise in semantics.
The statement made by Appellant on page 9 of the opening
brief is intended to acknowledge that under the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit, the officers may have had a heightened
interest in the Montgomery Avenue residence.

Based on that

heightened interest or hunch, the officers then could have attempted
to ascertain the name of the individual living in that house and
collect further information which may or may not have amounted to
probable cause.

Appellant meant in no way to suggest that such

heightened interest amounted to probable cause in and of itself.
A suspicion is just a guess, an inkling, a hunch, or a
thought that perhaps further scrutiny is required.

A suspicion is

less than a reasonable articulable suspicion as required under the
Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 12 in order to stop a person
for questioning and is much less than probable cause.

The State

attaches too much meaning to the word when it states "-ft] his

admission alone undermines Appellant's entire argument of
insufficient probable cause."

Respondent's brief at 7.

In its brief, the State asserts "[i]n many cases similar
to this case, the courts have upheld the magistrate's issuance of a
search warrant."

The State then cites State v. Moore, 441 So.2d

1003 (Ala. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Mena, 399 So.2d 149 (La. 1981);
State v. Yaritz, 287 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1979); and People v. Chase,
675 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1984).

The facts in all cases cited are

distinguishable from the facts in the present case, and those
factual differences are significant in determining whether probable
cause exists.
In State v. Moore, cited in Respondent's brief at 11, an
undercover officer had purchased cocaine directly from a cocaine
dealer on the 9th and 15th of July.

The officer again made

arrangements to buy an ounce of cocaine from the same dealer on
July 20. The dealer met with the officer on July 20 and sold him a
half ounce of cocaine.

At that time, the dealer informed the

officer that he could not provide the additional one-half ounce and
asked the officer to supply him with the money to purchase that
one-half ounce.

Officers then kept the dealer under visual

surveillance while he went to the residence of the defendant where
he purchased cocaine.

The dealer then returned to the officer and

gave him the cocaine.

Id,, at 1003-4.

The Moore Court recognized that "[s]ome courts have been
reluctant to find a sufficient nexus or connection" (Ld. at 1005)
for a finding of probable cause under circumstances similar to
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this.

In reaching its decision that probable cause existed under

the facts of that case, the Moore Court found especially significant
the fact that the dealer had made one sale to the officer, then told
the officer that he needed more cocaine before going to the house in
question.
The facts in the instant case are significantly different
from those in Moore.

First, an officer, not a confidential

informant, was the person who dealt directly with the dealer in
Moore.

In the present case, the officers are one step further

removed from the house that was searched than they were in Moore.2
Second, in Moore, the dealer made incriminating statements directly
to the officer that made it clear that he intended to go to the
house to obtain more cocaine.

In the present case, no such

statements were made by "Randy" to the confidential informant or
directly to an officer.

Nowhere in the affidavit does the affiant

state that "Randy" claimed to have obtained the drugs from the
Montgomery house or that "Randy" was in fact the dealer who gave
drugs to the confidential informant.

The reader of the affidavit is

left to speculate that that is what occurred, but neither "Randy"
nor the confidential informant made any such claims.
In State v. Mena, an undercover officer was directly
involved in the transaction as was the case in Moore.

The

2 The CI is an intermediary that did not exist in Moore.
Furthermore, Droubay's testimony during the first sixteen pages of
the transcript suggests that an additional intermediary existed—
i.e. the CI made arrangements with "Randy," then a person other than
"Randy" left the. house and drove to the Montgomery address.
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undercover officer met with the dealer at about 8:00 p.m. for the
purposes of purchasing a quarter ounce of cocaine.

The dealer

informed the officer that he had to get the cocaine from "his
connection" and told the officer to meet him at another place in
about fifty minutes.

The dealer made a phone call and then drove to

the apartment which was the subject of the search warrant.

The

dealer left the apartment about twenty minutes after entering with a
male later identified as the defendant Mena.

The dealer and Mena

went directly to the location where the officer was waiting, and
Mena participated in the sale to the officer.

Immediately after the

sale, officers arrested both the dealer and Mena.

The dealer then

told the arresting officer that he was obtaining his cocaine from
Mena and there was another person at Mena's apartment waiting for
the pair to return.

Officers immediately went to the premises to

secure it while other officers were obtaining the warrant.
The facts in the instant case are significantly different
from those in Mena.

First, the officers were not as directly

involved in the transaction; the officer in the present case dealt
with a confidential informant, who appeared to have dealt with
"Randy."

Second, there were no statements attributed to "Randy" to

the effect that his "connection" was at the Montgomery house.
Third, the defendant in the instant case, Mr. Pyeatt, was in no way
involved in the transaction.

Officers did not even identify the

occupants of the Montgomery house until after the search warrant had
been executed.

Fourth, the admission against interest made by the

dealer in the Mena case that he had been obtaining his cocaine from

- 9

-

Mena and that others were at the apartment awaiting his return was
especially compelling in that case.

As the Mena Court pointed out

"[a]dmissions of crime carry their own indicia of credibility
sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to
search" [citations omitted]."

Ld. at 152. While the facts in Mena

supported a finding that there was a "fair probability" that drugs
would be found in the apartment, the facts in the instant case do
not.
The facts in State v. Yaritz, 287 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1979),
are also significantly different from the facts in the present
case.

In Yaritz, the affiant officer had received information from

several sources that defendant Yaritz was a drug dealer.

Within a

month of the affidavit, the affiant officer had received information
that defendant Yaritz was still dealing in controlled substances and
that he lived at a certain address in St. Paul.

The affiant officer

then made two controlled buys from defendant Yaritz through an
informant.

For each of those purchases, the affiant searched the

informant, then gave him a sum of money to make the purchase. At
the same time, a group of officers watched the premises where Yaritz
lived and observed Yaritz leave those premises and go directly to
meet with the informant.

On each occasion, Yaritz gave the

informant controlled substances after leaving his premises. The
affidavit also indicated that officers had kept Yaritz under
surveillance and had seen him meet with several people known by the
officers to have been involved in narcotics violations in the past.
When he met with these people for possible drug transactions, he

used two different vehicles.

The officers were able to supply the

year, make and license number of each of those vehicles.
The facts in the instant case are strikingly different
from those in Yaritz.

First, there is at least one additional

intermediary in the present case.

Second, the officers did not see

anyone deal with the person who lived at 533 Montgomery and did not
know who lived there.

Nor did they see Mr. Pyeatt engage in

possible drug transaction or persons known to have been involved in
drug transactions enter the premises at Montgomery Avenue. Third,
it was clear in Yaritz that the informant obtained the controlled
substance directly from Yaritz, who had come directly from his home.
In the present case, it is not clear from the affidavit
that the substances came from "Randy" or from the Pyeatt home.
There are much wider gaps in the present case which leave open the
possibility that the controlled substance was in a vehicle, that
someone else was at the Atherton home who supplied the cocaine, that
the vehicle was used as a subterfuge in case the Atherton home was
being watched, or that the Pyeatt residence was not at all involved
in the transaction.

The affidavit indicates that traffic was

heavier at night and that the persons residing in the residence were
usually away during the day.

Such an assertion, however, is as

consistent with innocent activity as with criminal behavior.

The

holding in Yaritz is simply not compelling in light of the
significant difference between the facts in that case and the facts
in the instant case.
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Finally, in People v. Chase, 675 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1984), a
confidential informant met with a dealer to arrange the purchase of
an eighth of an ounce of cocaine.

The dealer had told the

confidential informant that he was the third person in a chain
selling cocaine which originated in Florida.

At the meeting, the

dealer told the informant that he had to go to his source for
cocaine and that he would meet the informant at another location in
forty-five minutes.

Officers followed the dealer to his own home

and then to a second location.

The dealer then met with the

informant and completed the cocaine transaction.

The trial court

granted the motion to suppress, but the Colorado Supreme Court
reversed, finding sufficient facts to support a finding of probable
cause.

In reaching its decision, the appellate court relied on the

dealer's statement that he needed to go to his source for the
cocaine.

The Court pointed out that that statement "establishes the

probability that he went to some third party residing at [the
premises that were searched]."

JA. at 318. No such statement

occurred in this case.
The facts set forth in the affidavit in the present case
failed to establish a fair probability that cocaine would be found
inside the Montgomery premises.

Much speculation and reliance on

circumstantial events, missing information, missing statements, and
guesswork is required in order to reach a conclusion that cocaine
was on the premises at 533 Montgomery.

The affidavit contains no

information that anyone saw drugs inside the premises at
533 Montgomery or that the informant claimed that "Randy" had sold
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him the cocaine.

There were no statements by Randy that he needed

to go to his source, and the officer was removed by at least two
intermediaries from the activity at the Montgomery house. The
affidavit requires that the magistrate rely not only on the
confidential informant's information but also that of "Randy," who
was an unknown in the operation.
The facts as set forth in the affidavit failed to support
a finding that probable cause existed to search the Montgomery
house.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits the issuance of a search

warrant based upon a hunch, speculation, or mere heightened
interest.

In this case where the search warrant was not supported

by probable cause, the fruits of the unlawful search should have
been suppressed; Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this Court
reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial absent
the illegally seized evidence.

B. DROUBAY ACTED INTENTIONALLY OR WITH A RECKLESS
DISREGARD FOR THE TRUTH IN INCLUDING THE MATERIAL
MISREPRESENTATIONS AND EXCLUDING THE MATERIAL
OMISSIONS.
In Points IB and II of his opening brief, Mr. Pyeatt
argues that Droubay acted intentionally or with a reckless disregard
for the truth when he misrepresented certain facts and omitted other
material facts from the affidavit.

In its brief, the Respondent

states that Mr. Pyeatt "has made no valid argument to show such
omissions or misrepresentations were intentional or reckless
disregard for the truth (sic)" and that "appellant has failed to

consider the totality of the circumstances in his piecemeal attack
on information contained in the affidavit".

Respondent's Brief at

16.
Contrary to Respondent's statements, Droubay's testimony
when read in conjunction with the affidavit establishes that he
acted with the requisite intent.

Furthermore, because it is

unlikely that an officer who intentionally misrepresents facts in an
affidavit will acknowledge that fact when subpoenaed for a motion to
suppress, one of the few ways in which a defendant can establish
that the affiant had the requisite intent is to analyze the
testimony and the affidavit step by step.
In the present case, the inconsistencies in the officer's
testimony and his attempts to cover lapses, when considered in
conjunction with the affidavit itself, establish that Droubay acted
intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth when he
prepared the affidavit.

Droubay had been an officer for only two

and one half years at the time of the incident (see Affidavit,
Addendum B in opening brief at 2). Droubay was unemployed and no
longer on the force at the time o£ the hearing on the motion to
suppress (T. 4 ) . Deputy Rigby, who had been on the force five
years, acknowledged that he would have handled the case differently;
in particular, he would have left officers at the Atherton address
for surveillance (T. 75-77, 80).
Defense counsel subpoenaed Droubay for the motion to
suppress and directly examined him.

During the first few minutes of

direct examination, Droubay acknowledged that the focus of the
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investigation was a person name "Randy" who lived in the Atherton
apartment (T. 9 ) , Droubay also acknowledged that there were usually
two persons in the apartment:

Randy, the focus of the

investigation, who stayed at the Atherton apartment during both
incidents set forth in the affidavit, and another "blonde-haired
younger fellow . . . who we observed leaving the apartment both
times.

He was the driver" (T. 13).
During this initial portion of testimony, Droubay also

pointed out that the blonde-haired kid who was the driver was named
Brad, and "[h]e was identified by first name to us by the CI at the
time of the first controlled buy. We knew who was going to be doing
the driving; we knew who we had to follow" (T. 15-16).

Up until

this point in his testimony, Droubay was working from his notes
only. Immediately after the above quote, defense counsel supplied
him with a copy of the affidavit, which Droubay reviewed before
giving further testimony (T. 16).
After reviewing the affidavit in which Brad is not
mentioned and it is stated that the CI gave the money to Randy,
Randy drove to the Montgomery address and Randy made a phone call,
Droubay's testimony changed.

He suggested that "it's common for

dealers of controlled substances to use an alias" (T. 18). He
testified that it was his initial belief that it was Randy who got
in the car and drove to the Montgomery address.

(T. 41). He also

testified that Randy had been described to him by the CI and that he
relied on such description to state in the affidavit that the person
who drove to Montgomery was named Randy (T. 62). This is contrary

-is-

to Droubay's earlier testimony that he knew all along that Brad, the
blonde-haired kid, would be doing the driving and was made only
after Droubay became aware of the discrepancy between his notes and
the affidavit.
Later, on cross examination by the prosecutor, Droubay
again stated that the blonde-haired kid was known to him as "Randy"
despite his earlier testimony that he knew all along that a person
other than Randy, a blonde-haired kid known as Brad, would be doing
the driving and that Randy stayed at the apartment during both
incidents (T. 47) .
Droubay went on to suggest that the confusion about who
Randy was resulted from Randy using an alias (T. 48). He suggested
that the curly-haired kid was using the name of Randy (T. 52) and
that the repeated references to the individual known as Randy in the
affidavit were all referring to the same person (T. 52, 61). Hence,
after reviewing his notes, but before reviewing the affidavit,
Droubay acknowledged that someone other than Randy drove to the
Montgomery address.

However, after reviewing the affidavit and

recognizing the significant misrepresentation that occurred therein,
Droubay's testimony changed and he attempted to suggest that the
person with whom the CI made arrangements and to whom the CI gave
the money was the same person who drove the vehicle to Montgomery.
This is contrary to Droubay's testimony contained in the first
fifteen pages of the transcript.
In addition, as set forth in appellant's opening brief at
27, Droubay attempted to suggest that the Atherton apartment had
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been covered by an officer despite the fact that Droubay had read
his report and there was no indication in the report that such
coverage had occurred (T. 38-9).

The other officers involved, none

of which were in charge as Droubay had been, clearly remembered that
no one covered the Atherton apartment (T. 72, 74-5, 84). This
apparent fabrication while testifying suggests the ease with which
Droubay intentionally misrepresented the facts.
Finally, as also set forth in appellant's opening brief,
Droubay's misrepresentations about the day and night surveillance
further suggest that, at the very least, he acted with a reckless
disregard for the truth, and more likely, intentionally in
misrepresenting the facts in the affidavit.
As the Utah Supreme Court pointed out in State v.
Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), a law enforcement officer is
aware of the need for accuracy and truthfulness in preparing an
affidavit and such awareness should be taken into account when
determining whether the officer had the requisite intent when he
included the falsehood.

That awareness, coupled with the serious

inconsistencies in Droubay's testimony and his attempts to cover
lapses show that Droubay acted with the requisite intent in this
case.
POINT II
THE SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT ARE
INVALID UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Respondent acknowledges that Mr. Pyeatt's argument under
this section is "well taken" but contends that the circumstances in
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this case do not warrant a different construction under the Utah
Constitution,

Respondent's Brief at 17. Contrary to the State's

assertion, there is a basis for interpreting the Utah Constitution
differently than the federal constitution.
The Utah Supreme Court was clear in stating that its
decision in State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986) was not
dispositive of how the issue might be resolved under the Utah
Constitution.

I^d. at 192. Furthermore, in Franks v. Delaware, 438

U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed. 2d 667 (1978), defense counsel
conceded that where an affiant intentionally included
misrepresentations in the affidavit, the appropriate approach was to
excise the misrepresentations rather than quash the entire
affidavit.

Defense counsel in Franks also conceded that no

violation would occur unless the affiant had reason to believe the
included information was false.

Hence, the rule in Franks v.

Delaware that a remedy exists for intentional violations and that
such remedy is the excision of the misrepresentations arose out of
concessions of counsel and does not necessarily preclude quashing
the entire affidavit or allowing a remedy when the
misrepresentations were merely negligent.
In this case where all of the evidence establishes that
the officer intentionally included the misrepresentations, a
question arises as to his veracity and reliability and as to the
credibility of the entire affidavit.

Under such circumstances, the

entire affidavit should be quashed.
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Just as in some situations, an officer's conduct is "so
extreme as to constitute a due process violation under either the
Utah or the United States Constitution," requiring that the
government not use judicial processes to obtain a conviction (see
State v. Colonna, 97 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 20 (1988)), in cases where a
police officer deliberately misrepresents the facts or does so with
a reckless disregard for the truth, the entire affidavit should be
quashed.
Furthermore, if this court determines that the testimony
of Droubay when read in conjunction with the affidavit does not
establish that he intentionally misrepresented the facts or that he
did so with a reckless disregard for the truth, the numerous
misrepresentations and omissions which significantly altered the
facts known to Droubay at the time he prepared the search warrant,
established that he was at least negligent in preparing that
affidavit.

Under such circumstances, the remedy outlined in

Appellant's opening brief at 36-7 is appropriate.
Hence, if this court determines that the warrant should
be upheld under federal law, there is nevertheless a basis for
deciding the case differently under the Utah Constitution.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant/defendant, Steven Pyeatt, respectfully requests
that this Court reverse his conviction and remand his case for a new
trial without the illegally seized evidence or, in the alternative,
dismissal.
Respectfully submitted this
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